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Abstract
With today's prevalence of Internet-connected systems storing sensitive data and the 
omnipresent threat of technically skilled malicious users, computer security remains a 
critically important field. Because of today's multitude of vulnerable systems and security 
threats, it is vital that computer science students be taught techniques for programming 
secure systems, especially since many of them will work on systems with sensitive data 
after graduation. Teaching computer science students proper design, implementation, and 
maintenance of secure systems is a challenging task that calls for the use of novel 
pedagogical tools. This report describes the implementation of a compiler that converts 
mandatory access control specification Domain-Type Enforcement Language to the Java 
Security Manager, primarily for pedagogical purposes. The implementation of the Java 
Security Manager was explored in depth, and various techniques to work around its 
inherent limitations were explored and partially implemented, although some of these 
workarounds do not appear in the current version of the compiler because they would 
have compromised cross-platform compatibility. The current version of the compiler and 
implementation details of the Java Security Manager are discussed in depth.
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Chapter 1. Introduction
1.1. Background
Designing and enforcing information security policies is a significant challenge. Today, 
system designers and administrators face a combination of ubiquitous Internet 
connections, heavy dependence on functional computing infrastructures, storage of 
massive amounts of sensitive data, and myriad technically skilled malicious agents. In 
this environment, maintaining a secure system is crucial.
Many tools and techniques have been developed to address this challenge. Among these 
tools are discretionary access controls and mandatory access controls. Discretionary 
access controls restrict access to entities based on the identity of subjects, such as users 
and processes, to which they belong. The owner can typically transfer permissions to 
other subjects as well, hence the term discretionary. An example of a discretionary access 
control is the familiar Unix permission system. In this system, every file defines read, 
write, and execute permissions for that file's owner, group, and everyone else. Typically, 
the owner of the file can change these permissions at will. For instance, the owner may 
grant himself the ability to read and write to a file, give his group read-only access, and 
not allow users outside the group to access the file at all.
In mandatory access control, the operating system or similar entity constrains access 
based on a set of rules. In this paradigm, subjects may not transfer access rights if they 
are restricted from doing so. In other words, it is the system (and the person responsible 
for maintaining the system), not end users, that controls file system and execution 
permissions. As an example, the system may divide users into various classes and restrict 
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users based on class from accessing the files in a given directory and its subdirectories. In 
this case, if users did not belong to the appropriate class, there is nothing they could do to 
access the restricted directory, nor could anyone grant them this permission except by 
changing the system's security configuration, or by moving them to another class (an 
action which itself would probably be restricted by the security configuration). The 
ability to configure universal security restrictions in this manner is a powerful tool.
One such mandatory access control is Domain Type Enforcement (DTE) [1]. The two 
most important concepts in DTE are domains and types. Domains define a security 
context in which processes operate, while types categorize paths in the file system's 
directory structure. Access modes, which include reading, writing, executing, and 
creating files, are restricted from domains to types and also between domains. Badger et 
al [2] have presented a formal definition for specifying DTE policies known as Domain 
Type Enforcement Language (DTEL). DTEL allows for the creation of more compact 
and maintainable security policies than standard type enforcement, which requires the 
development and maintenance of potentially enormous access control tables [3]. A DTEL 
policy file concisely describes all of the domains, types, and the access modes that are 
permitted between them on a given system.
Security is vital not only at the operating system level, but also at the application level. 
Safe programming languages include facilities for writing secure code. The Java 
programming language, in particular, is known for having robust security features. One 
such feature is the Java Security Manager (JSM). Java applications subject to a JSM 
check with the JSM when performing certain actions, such as file system access, and 
those actions are then permitted or denied based on the JSM's internal logic. A custom 
security policy can be implemented by overriding the SecurityManager class and its 
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relevant methods, then invoking the SecurityManager in the application to be restricted. 
The SecurityManager is implemented by overriding certain methods which are called 
whenever a particular action is performed; for example, checkRead and checkWrite [5]
[14].
A fundamental similarity exists between DTEL and JSM. Both define security policies 
that restrict certain kinds of actions – especially file system access – based on explicitly 
defined criteria. However, they have many differences as well.  DTEL's security 
configuration operates at the operating system level, while JSM operates at the level of an 
individual application. A system under the purview of a DTEL specification is subject to 
those restrictions whether it wants to be or not, whereas a Java application must willingly 
invoke a JSM class to be subject to its restrictions. Furthermore, DTEL security criteria 
are tightly defined and limited, while a JSM class can determine security restrictions 
based on any criteria that can be programmatically implemented in its internal logic. In 
this respect, JSM is more flexible in its ability to define security policies. However, 
certain limitations in JSM's implementation place considerable restrictions on its ability 
to implement certain kinds of security checks.
1.2. Motivation
As the design and implementation of good security policies is difficult, so too is teaching 
students how to understand computer security. To address this challenge, many 
pedagogical tools have been developed. Specifically as relates to this project, Carr and 
Mayo [4] have described using DTE to teach students the fundamentals of access control.
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The Domain Type Enforcement Language to Java Security Manager Compiler (D2JC) is 
intended to expand the pedagogical potential of DTE as a learning tool. By using D2JC, 
students will gain a multifaceted understanding of DTE, the Java Security Manager, and 
access control in general. D2JC accepts only valid DTE specifications and includes 
thorough semantic checks, so in order to use the compiler, students must be able to 
produce well-formed DTE specifications and will be alerted to any semantic errors in 
their security policies. D2JC outputs Java code specifying a custom SecurityManager 
class, so in order to use the security policy within the context of a Java application, 
students must understand how to assign a custom security manager to their application. 
Finally, by seeing how the security manager interacts with their file system accesses, they 
will observe how JSM functions and can also test and explore the implementation of their 
security policy.
Together, it is hoped that these features will provide instructors with a useful tool for 
teaching the idiosyncrasies of access control, DTE, and JSM to their students.
1.3. Outcome
The current version of D2JC includes a robust parser that is capable of detecting and 
reporting a wide range of both syntactic and semantic errors in DTEL specifications. 
Simply by compiling their DTEL specifications, students will learn not only how to 
create well-formed DTEL syntax, but also the kinds of logical mistakes that might appear 
in their policies and how to avoid them. If compilation is successful, D2JC outputs code 
for a valid JSM class that maps certain restrictions (primarily simple file access controls) 
in the DTEL specification into JSM equivalents. This code can then be compiled and the 
resulting JSM class can be invoked by Java applications to implement the security 
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restrictions. This process will teach students about Java compilation, how to invoke the 
Java Security Manager, and provide the ability to test a subset of DTEL specifications 
written by the students (or provided to them by instructors).
Additionally, implementation details of the Java Security Manager itself were explored in 
detail. Some surprising limitations (discussed in detail in subsection 3.2.3) were 
discovered in the JSM's implementation that prevented a full mapping of DTEL to JSM 
restrictions. To summarize, it was discovered that the JSM's ability to check the 
execution of system commands is impaired; the Java FileDescriptor class does not 
contain enough information to check path-based file system accesses without complex 
workarounds; and the JSM is subject to its own security restrictions which can throw it 
into an infinite loop. The opportunity was taken to research potential solutions to these 
issues. Some of these solutions were partially implemented, but they are not included in 
the final product because they would hamper cross-platform compatibility. Despite these 
limitations, D2JC still has considerable value as a pedagogical tool.
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Chapter 2. Related Work
2.1. Domain Type Enforcement
The flexibility of DTE has attracted a significant amount of attention in research. Badger 
et al [2][1] formulated DTEL as an expression of DTE policies and have explored 
potential applications. Tidswell and Potter [15] proposed a dynamically configurable 
variant of DTE. Hallyn and Kearns [6] have explored the implementation of DTE in 
Linux. Kiszka et al [10] applied DTE to a security model divided into real-time and 
non-real-time components and predicted emerging applications and system responses to 
expected attacks.
2.2. Security Visualizations
D2JC was built upon an existing DTEL parser. The base code has been used for other 
projects besides the D2JC, such as DTEvisual by Li et al [12]. Expanding on the 
pedagogical uses of DTE, DTEvisual accepts a valid DTE specification as input and 
outputs a graphical representation of the access control policy. DTEvisual is used for 
educational purposes such as modifying policies during classroom lectures.
Because humans are adept at interpreting data visually, security visualizations have a 
high potential to improve understanding of security policies and even real-time security 
events. Recognizing this, other researchers have also developed security visualization 
tools. Hallyn and Kearns [7] have developed a tool called DTEView to aid the 
construction of sound DTE policy files through visual representation. Marty [13] 
describes techniques for using visualization to extract meaningful information from 
network security logs. Other examples of security visualizations include NVisionCC, a 
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tool developed by Yurcik et al [16] for visualizing security events on high performance 
clusters, potentially allowing for much better security maintenance of high-node clusters 
than traditional command-line tools; and the Intrusion Detection Toolkit by Komlodi et al 
[11], a visualization tool for detecting intruders on a network.
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Chapter 3. The DTEL to JSM Compiler
3.1. The DTEL Parser
D2JC was built upon an existing DTEL parser. The parser was written using the Java 
Compiler Compiler (JavaCC), “a tool that reads a grammar specification and converts it 
to a Java program that can recognize matches to the grammar” [8] and converts valid 
DTEL specifications into Java data structures for other uses such as the DTEvisual tool 
[12].
In implementing D2JC, several minor bug fixes were applied to the existing code base 
and semantic error checking was added. If a semantic error is detected, the program 
terminates compilation and prints an appropriate error message. Errors detected by the 
semantic checker include the following:
• Multiple types defined with the same name.
• Multiple domains defined with the same name.
• Assigning to a nonexistent type.
• A domain and type sharing the same name.
• The same path is assigned to multiple types.
• No generic type is assigned.
• The initial domain is not a domain.
• Permissions are applied to something that is not a type (e.g., a domain).
• Exec or auto is applied to a non-domain entity.
If the scanner reads the DTEL specification successfully and the parser finds no semantic 
errors, the program reports that parsing was completed successfully, and compilation is 
allowed to continue. If the user specified the “-jsm” command line option when invoking 
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the compiler, the compiler proceeds to convert the DTEL Specification into Java Security 
Manager code.
3.2. Restrictions and Limitations
There is not a 1:1 mapping between DTE and JSM. DTE is a general-purpose mandatory 
access control specification, whereas JSM intercepts certain kinds of operations invoked 
from a Java application and either permits or denies those operations. Because of this, 
there are some aspects of DTE which have no JSM equivalent, and vice-versa.
3.2.1. DTE-to-JSM Non-Equivalencies
UNIX signals. Because a Java application could potentially be running on any operating 
system, implementing controls for UNIX signals (e.g., sigkill, sigpause, etc.) would be 
unnecessarily restrictive and eliminate cross-platform compatibility.
Domain transitions. The DTEL specification allows for controlling domain transitions 
via auto and exec. This involves the creation of a new process. In order to be meaningful, 
the new process must be subject to the same security restrictions as the process that 
spawned it. The JSM clearly cannot enforce its own restrictions on any non-Java 
processes that are spawned. Even if a new Java process is spawned, potential techniques 
for transferring the JSM's security restrictions to the new process were deemed 
unacceptable, as described under subsection 3.2.3, “Limitations of the Java Security 
Manager.”
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3.2.2. JSM-to-DTE Non-Equivalencies
Sockets. The JSM allows security restrictions on a Java application's socket connections. 
Extensive research did not uncover equivalent restrictions configurable through DTE.
Threads. The JSM allows security restrictions on thread access. DTE allows 
inter-process restrictions via subject access rights, but no equivalent was found for 
threads.
Java-specific components. The JSM allows security restrictions on the Java class loader, 
package access, and properties access. As these are Java-specific security concerns, DTE 
contains no equivalent.
3.2.3. Limitations of the Java Security Manager
Even among those security concerns which are shared by DTE and the JSM, not all of 
them could be implemented due to limitations in the JSM's design. These limitations are 
described below.
Transferring JSM access restrictions. Ordinarily, a Java application must explicitly 
install a custom security manager in order to be subject to its security restrictions. 
Initially, the D2JC project assumed that a rough simulation of a complete mandatory 
access control scheme might be achieved by forcing the initial application to invoke the 
DTE-specified JSM and then transferring the JSM's security restrictions to any 
subsequent Java applications invoked by the initial application. This approach assumes 
that forcing the JSM upon subsequently invoked applications is feasible.
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Subsequent research revealed this to be unworkable. It is possible to assign a security 
manager to a Java application via the command line. The initial approach was to intercept 
command-line calls initiated by the initial application. Thus, if the initial application 
launched another Java process with a call such as
java ApplicationToInvoke
the security manager would intercept that call and replace it with
java -Djava.security.manager=SecMgr ApplicationToInvoke
thereby transferring its properties to the new application.
However, this approach is thwarted by the fact that JSM's method for checking system 
calls, checkExec(String command),  receives only the first word of the call. Using the 
previous examples, the parameter command would contain the string “java”, nothing 
more. This is insufficient information to apply meaningful security restrictions to system 
calls.
Due to this limitation, D2JC does not transfer JSM restrictions, nor provide an 
implementation for the checkExec method.
Reading and writing files with FileDescriptors. The JSM includes multiple 
variations of the checkRead and checkWrite methods, including methods which accept 
FileDescriptors as parameters. This is problematic because the FileDescriptor class 
contains no path information, which DTE requires to perform access checks.
Extensive research revealed a possible workaround for this issue. The FileDescriptor 
class (obtained by downloading the Java source) contains the fields fd and handle. These 
are private fields, but they may be accessed using reflection [9], as follows:
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Field privateField = FileDescriptor.class.getDeclaredField("fd");
privateField.setAccessible(true);
int fd = (int)privateField.get(filedescriptor);
Thus armed with the value of the file descriptor, the JSM could invoke an operating 
system tool such as lsof to obtain a list of open files, compare them to the obtained 
filedescriptor to find the file in question, get the path information, and finally apply DTE 
restrictions.
This solution was partially implemented before it was deemed too operating 
system-dependent. The current version of D2JC simply denies all file system accesses 
attempted with FileDescriptors.
The Java Security Manager is subject to its own restrictions. For example, if the JSM 
attempts to open a file as part of a security check, it calls its own checkRead method to 
see if the access is allowed. Combined with certain other Java design decisions, this has 
the effect of creating situations where infinite recursive calls of security checks are 
unavoidable.
In particular, this behavior interferes with the enforcement of file and directory creation 
permissions. All of the standard Java file output operations work by automatically 
creating the file being written to (as well as requisite path structure) if it does not already 
exist. In order to implement file/directory creation checks, it is necessary to first check if 
the file being written to does not yet exist; and if it does not, to check the relevant 
permissions.
However, checking for the existence of a file in Java involves creating a new File object 
and then checking for its existence; i.e.,
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File file = new File(path);
if(!file.exists()) { /* file creation permission check */ }
This is a problem because the instantiation of the File class causes the security manager 
to invoke its own security checks, initiating an endless loop which quickly floods the call 
stack and results in the termination of the application.
This behavior might be avoided by invoking native code and performing the file 
existence check from there (an option that was explored in some depth), but this would 
severely hamper cross-platform compatibility, a limitation deemed unacceptable in the 
implementation of this project.
Because of this behavior, the current version of D2JC is unable to enforce these 
permissions.
3.3. The DTE to JSM Converter
Although JSM can make only limited use of the DTE specification, D2JC outputs JSM 
code that contains a complete internal representation of all aspects of DTE which are 
currently supported by the parser. It also overrides all variations of the checkWrite and 
checkRead methods to implement those file system checks which it is able.
The JSM generated by D2JC employs the use of five internal classes for converting the 
DTE permissions to a usable internal representation. The full code of these classes is 
given in Listing 3.1.
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Listing 3.1. Internal classes of the D2JC-generated JSM.
class Permission {
public ArrayList<String> types;
public boolean read = false;
public boolean write = false;
public boolean exec = false;
public boolean dir = false;
public boolean create = false;
}
class Transition {
public boolean auto = false;
public boolean exec = false;
public ArrayList<String> domains;
}
class Domain {
public String name;
public ArrayList<String> entryPoints;
public ArrayList<Permission> permissions;
public ArrayList<Transition> transitions;
}
class Type {
public String name;
public ArrayList<TypeAssignment> assignments;
}
class TypeAssignment {
public boolean recursive;
public boolean staticOpt;
public ArrayList<String> paths;
}
When invoked to output JSM code, the compiler uses the information stored by the 
DTEL parser to generate a constructor that instantiates objects of the classes given in 
listing 3.1, assigns their values, and ultimately places them in ArrayLists of Domains 
and Types. It then assigns its own domain as the initial_domain defined in the DTEL 
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specification and determines the current working directory of the application that invoked 
the JSM.
For executing its file system permission checks, the D2JC-generated JSM implements the 
following helper methods:
String convertPath(String path): Converts Windows paths into Unix paths. Unix 
paths are returned unaltered.
String combinePaths(String left, String right): Extrapolates a single absolute 
path from the left path which is used as the “base” (in practice, the current working 
directory of the application that invoked the JSM) and the right path which is a relative 
path from the base. It is intelligent enough to parse the ../ character sequence to move 
up the directory structure of the base path. If the right parameter is an absolute instead 
of relative path (i.e. it is preceded by a slash /), the left parameter is ignored and the 
right parameter is returned unaltered.
ArrayList<String> getTypes(String path): Returns a list of all Types that contain 
the path supplied.
boolean checkPermission(String type, int permission): Checks if, under the 
current Domain, the given type permits permission, which is a coded parameter. Values 
of 0 through 4 correspond to the permissions create, read, write, execute, and directory, 
respectively.
boolean filesystemCheck (String type, int permission): A generalized method 
that contains code common to all file system checks, called on behalf of the JSM's 
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checkRead and checkWrite methods, which supply the relevant permission to be 
checked.
Finally, the D2JC-generated JSM overrides the following SecurityManager methods, 
which use the helper methods described above:
• checkDelete(String filename)
• checkRead(FileDescriptor filedescriptor): Always throws a 
SecurityException (see subsection 3.2.3).
• checkRead(String filename)
• checkRead(String filename, Object executionContext): The 
executionContext is irrelevant to the DTE check and is ignored.
• checkWrite(FileDescriptor filedescriptor): Always throws a 
SecurityException (see subsection 3.2.3).
• checkWrite(String filename)
A more robust implementation was planned and partially implemented, but numerous 
features were cut from the final version of the project for reasons described in subsection 
3.2.3.
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Chapter 4. Tests and Performance Analysis
4.1. Semantic Error Checking
In order to demonstrate the abilities of the semantic error checker, the following 
malformed DTEL specification was created:
Listing 4.1. Malformed DTEL specification.
type same_name, same_t, same_t, dup_assign;
domain same_name = (/sbin/init),
(rd->same_d),
(auto->same_t);
domain same_d = (/usr/bin/login),
(crwd->same_t),
(exec->same_d);
domain same_d = (/usr/bin/{sh, csh, tcsh}),
(crwxd->same_name),
(rwd->same_t);
initial_domain = same_t;
assign -r    same_name  /usr/var, /dev, /tmp, /test;
assign -r    same_t     /etc;
assign -r    dup_assign /dev;
assign -r    non_existent /fakepath;
assign -r -s same_t /dte;
The DTEL specification given in Listing 4.1 contains the following semantic errors:
• The initial domain is assigned to a type.
• There is no generic type.
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• The name same_name is defined for a type and a domain.
• There are two domains called same_d.
• There are two types called same_t.
• A domain tries to assign auto to a type.
• Access permissions are applied to a domain.
• Attempts to assign to a nonexistent type (non_existent).
• Attempts to assign the path /dev to multiple types.
When attempting to compile the DTEL file, the compiler reports each of these errors:
Type 'same_t' has multiple definitions.
Domain 'same_d' has multiple definitions.
Type and domain lists both contain identifier 'same_name'
There is no generic type defined.
initial_domain set to 'same_t' which is not defined as a domain
Permissions tried to reference undefined type 'same_d'
Attempted exec or auto transition to 'same_t' which is not defined 
as a domain
Invalid identifier 'non_existent' with assign statement.
Path '/dev' assigned to multiple types
Note that each of these errors corresponds to one of the semantic checks described in 
Section 3.1, so this comprises a thorough test of the semantic checker's ability to detect 
all of the errors defined for this version of D2JC. Fixing each of these errors yields the 
DTEL specification given in Listing 4.2.
Listing 4.2. Corrected DTEL specification.
type same_name, same_t, diff_t;
domain diff_name = (/sbin/init),
(rd->same_t),
(auto->same_d);
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domain same_d = (/usr/bin/login),
(crwd->same_t),
(exec->same_d);
domain diff_d = (/usr/bin/{sh, csh, tcsh}),
(crwxd->same_name),
(rwd->diff_t);
initial_domain = same_d;
assign -r    same_name  /usr/var, /dev, /tmp, /test;
assign -r    same_t     /;
assign -r -s diff_t /dte;
When the compiler is run on the corrected DTEL specification, it reports no errors and 
compilation is completed successfully, outputting Java code for a custom security 
manager.
4.2. File System Permissions
In order to function correctly, the JSM class outputted by D2JC must have the following 
behaviors:
1. It should be subject to the permission restrictions defined by the DTEL 
specification for the initial domain.
2. Because the current version of D2JC does not support transitioning to other 
domains, it should not be subject to permission restrictions for other domains 
besides the initial domain.
3. It should be able to write to files in those directories defined as writable for the 
types assigned to the initial domain.
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4. It should be able to read from files in those directories defined as writable for the 
types assigned to the initial domain.
5. It should not be able to read/write from files for which it has not been given 
permission to do so via type assignment to the initial domain.
6. It should parse both Windows and Unix paths correctly.
7. It should understand that the ../ character sequence in directory paths means to 
move up in the directory structure.
In order to test the correct functioning of D2JC's file system permissions, the following 
DTEL specification was created:
Listing 4.3. DTEL specification for testing file system permissions.
type generic_t, writable_t, readable_t, both_t, neither_t, 
other_t;
domain start_d =  (/sbin/init),
                  (r->readable_t),
                  (w->writable_t),
(rw->both_t);
domain unreachable_d = (/fakepath),
                       (rw->other_t);
initial_domain = start_d;
assign -r    generic_t   /;
assign -r    writable_t  /test/writable;
assign -r    readable_t  /test/readable;
assign -r    neither_t   /test/neither;
assign -r    other_t     /test/otherd;
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assign -r    both_t      /test/both, /test/both2;
The DTEL specification in Listing 4.3 defines six types, including a generic type to 
satisfy DTE requirements. The specification also defines two domains, start_d and 
unreachable_d. start_d is defined as the initial domain. This domain is given read 
permission to readable_t, write permission to writable_t, read and write permission 
to both_t, and no permissions to the other types. unreachable_d is given read and write 
permissions to other_t.
To test the JSM class generated when this DTEL file is compiled with D2JC, the 
following application was created:
Listing 4.4. Security test application to verify the custom JSM's behavior.
import java.io.*;
class SecurityTest {
public static void main(String[] args) {
// Assign security manager
try {
            System.setSecurityManager(new DTESecurityManager());
        } catch (Exception e) {
            System.out.println("Error: " + e.getMessage());
        }
System.out.println("Successfully set security manager.");
// Write to /test/writable
try {
FileWriter fstream = new 
FileWriter("M:\\test\\writable\\WriteOut.txt");
BufferedWriter out = new BufferedWriter(fstream);
out.write("Writing to file.");
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out.close();
} catch (Exception e) {
System.err.println("Error: " + e.getMessage());
}
// Read from /test/writable
try {
FileReader fstream = new 
FileReader("/test/writable/ReadIn.txt");
BufferedReader in = new BufferedReader(fstream);
System.out.println(in.readLine());
in.close();
} catch (Exception e) {
System.err.println("Error: " + e.getMessage());
}
// Write to /test/writable/deeper
try {
FileWriter fstream = new 
FileWriter("/test/writable/deeper/../deeper/WriteOut.txt");
BufferedWriter out = new BufferedWriter(fstream);
out.write("Writing to file.");
out.close();
} catch (Exception e) {
System.err.println("Error: " + e.getMessage());
}
// Read from /test/writable/deeper
try {
FileReader fstream = new 
FileReader("/test/writable/deeper/ReadIn.txt");
BufferedReader in = new BufferedReader(fstream);
System.out.println(in.readLine());
in.close();
} catch (Exception e) {
System.err.println("Error: " + e.getMessage());
}
// Similar tests for remaining types
// (omitted from code listing)
26
System.out.println("Testing complete.");
}
}
The application in Listing 4.4 tries to read from and write to /test/writable, and then, 
to ensure that permissions are being applied recursively (so that paths do not have to be 
an exact match, but may be prefixes), it tries to read from and write to 
/test/writable/deeper. It performs the same tests with /test/readable and 
/test/neither. It then performs the same tests with /test/otherd, /test/both, and 
/test/both2, except that the deeper checks are omitted for brevity, recursive 
directories having already been checked by the preceding tests. If any of these operations 
throws an exception, it catches the exception and prints it to stdout. The relevant 
directories and the ReadIn.txt files were created ahead of time for the purposes of the 
test. The text files contained a single line of text, “I am the first line from the ReadIn file 
in [path to file].”
This application comprises a thorough test of the required behaviors defined previously. 
Attempting to read from and write to the various directories defined by the DTEL 
specification, including directories with only read, only write, and both read and write 
permissions, verifies requirements (1), (3), (4), and (5). Attempting to read from and 
write to /test/otherd, which the domain unreachable_d has permissions to, verifies 
requirement (2), that other domains' permissions are not being applied to the current 
domain. The application also includes a Windows-style path, verifying condition (6), and 
a path that uses the ../ character sequence, verifying condition (7).
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Running this test yielded the following output:
Successfully set security manager.
Error: Current domain does not have read permission to 
/test/writable/ReadIn.txt
Error: Current domain does not have read permission to 
/test/writable/deeper/ReadIn.txt
Error: Current domain does not have write permission to 
/test/readable/WriteOut.txt
I am the first line from the ReadIn file in /test/readable.
Error: Current domain does not have write permission to 
/test/readable/deeper/WriteOut.txt
I am the first line from the ReadIn file in /test/readable/deeper.
Error: Current domain does not have write permission to 
/test/neither/WriteOut.txt
Error: Current domain does not have read permission to 
/test/neither/ReadIn.txt
Error: Current domain does not have write permission to 
/test/neither/deeper/WriteOut.txt
Error: Current domain does not have read permission to 
/test/neither/deeper/ReadIn.txt
Error: Current domain does not have write permission to 
/test/otherd/WriteOut.txt
Error: Current domain does not have read permission to 
/test/otherd/ReadIn.txt
I am the first line from the ReadIn file in /test/both.
I am the first line from the ReadIn file in /test/both2.
Testing complete.
Lastly, an examination of the directories revealed that the WriteOut.txt files had been 
created in /test/writable, /test/writable/deeper, /test/both, and 
/test/both2, and contained the correct text contents, but these files had not been 
created in the other directories. This is the expected behavior, thus verifying the correct 
operation of the permission checks.
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4.3. Performance Analysis
4.3.1. Compilation Time
In the process of performing semantic error checking, the compiler makes numerous 
comparisons. A small number of these comparisons occur during the scanning phase and 
are dependent on the time complexity of the scanner, which was written prior to this 
project. The remainder of the checks and their time complexities are analyzed below:
A generic type and initial domain are validly specified. These checks both use data 
gathered during scanning that allows them to be performed in constant time.
Duplicate names in types and domains. To ensure that no type possesses the same 
name as any domain, the parser compares each domain with each type, resulting in O(dt) 
complexity where d and t are the numbers of domains and types, respectively.
Duplicate type assignments. To ensure that the same path is not assigned to any two 
types, the parser compares every path in every type with every path in every other type, 
resulting in O(p2) complexity where p is the total number of paths from all types.
Permissions are only applied to types. To ensure that permissions are not applied to a 
non-type entity, for every set of permissions, the parser checks that permission's target 
with all types, resulting in O(pt) complexity where p and t are the number of permissions 
and types, respectively.
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Transitions are only applied to domains. To ensure that auto or exec transitions are not 
applied to a non-domain entity, for every set of transitions, the parser checks that 
transition's target with all domains, resulting in O(rd) complexity where r and d are the 
number of transitions and domains, respectively.
All of these checks require either constant or polynomial time, so the semantic error 
checks added by the D2JC parser add polynomial time complexity to the compilation 
time of DTEL specifications.
4.3.2. Real-time Permission Checks
Every file system check in D2JC is performed in essentially the same manner. First, the 
security manager iterates through all of its paths, noting those which match the path of 
the file being checked and recording their corresponding types. This operation is linear in 
the number of paths contained in the DTE specification. Then the security manager 
iterates through all of the types returned in the preceding operation, and for each one, it 
iterates through all of the permissions defined for the current domain, all of the types 
assigned to those permissions, and allows the access if the requested operation is allowed 
for any of the types whose paths correspond to the file being checked. If the security 
manager completes this entire process without finding any matches, then it denies the 
access attempt.
The total running time of one check is therefore O(t1pt2) + O(h), where t1 is the number of 
types to check against, p is the number of permissions in the current domain, t2 is the 
number of types in each permission, and h is the number of paths in the DTE 
specification. Although this is a polynomial-time operation, the values of t1, p, and t2 are 
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likely to be small even in relatively complex DTE specifications, so these checks can be 
completed quickly in the vast majority of cases.
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Chapter 5. Conclusion
5.1. Future Work
The current version of D2JC is limited in the DTEL restrictions it can implement. It could 
gain even more value as a pedagogical tool if its capabilities were expanded. One 
approach would be to implement some of the workarounds described in subsection 3.2.3, 
which were deemed infeasible for this version of the compiler. Different versions of the 
compiler could be implemented for different operating systems in an effort to preserve 
cross-platform compatibility.
Alternatively, future iterations of the project could explore alternatives to the Java 
Security Manager. For example, JSM shares security responsibilities with the access 
controller and class loader [14]. If D2JC were modified to output not only JSM code, but 
to utilize additional Java security features, it may be able to achieve a more robust 
implementation of DTEL specifications.
Another alternative would be to implement a special Java application that acts as a virtual 
machine specifically for implementing DTE security policies. This virtual machine could 
implement its own, more powerful version of the security manager, and D2JC could be 
modified to output code for this customized JSM. This approach would allow for 
unlimited implementation of DTEL specifications, but implementing the virtual machine 
might involve a significant amount of work.
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5.2. Potential Applications
D2JC's limitations render it inappropriate for industrial use, but it contains many features 
valuable for pedagogical purposes. It is useful for teaching students how to create 
well-formed DTEL specifications due to its syntactic and semantic error checking. It also 
teaches students the basics of incorporating the Java Security Manager into their 
applications, since the code outputted by D2JC needs to be compiled and installed 
manually in the application that will make use of it. It also provides an implementation of 
most of DTE's file permission security checks. However, it must be noted that there are 
many parts of the DTEL specification that cannot be implemented in the outputted JSM 
code, so while D2JC has substantial use as a supplement, it is not a complete tool for 
teaching students how DTE works.
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